Tullock why so much stability

ConclusionProfessor Tullock has raised a central question in the confrontation between abstract models of PMR and majority rule as practiced in real institutions. We believe the decision making … Expand. Sophisticated voting and gate-keeping in the supreme court. The U. Supreme Court is one … Expand. Recent results in the theory of pure majority rule demonstrate the genericity of majority rule cycles.

As established by Richard McKelvey , L. Cohen and N. Schofield , majority … Expand. The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power. Legislative committees have fascinated scholars and reformers for more than a century.

All acknowledge the central strategic position of committees in legislatures. The consensus, however, centers on … Expand. Universalism in Congress. Several earlier attempts at explaining the norm of universalism in Congress rely on a simple expected value comparison between the rewards to legislators of the coalition of the whole as against the … Expand. This paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions, often approaching unanimous size, in the realm of distributive policies.

Distributive policies are those which … Expand. Why so much stability? Niemi , in an important but neglected paper, found that when orderings were drawn from a simulation based on the impartial culture, the greater the proportion of voter orderings that were … Expand. This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions.

Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect … Expand. View 1 excerpt, references background. A mathematical proof of Duverger's Law. In this chapter, we have mainly a theoretical discussion of what I think is … Expand. Cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting. Concluding remarksIn light of the extensive theoretical evidence suggesting absence of equilibrium in voting models, Tullock asks "Why So Much Stability? Recontracting, trustworthiness, and the stability of vote exchanges.

Tullock has recently restated a discrepancy between theory and observation that exists in collective decisions, and made a start toward explaining the discrepancy.

The discrepancy, stated … Expand. The Silent Revolution of Probabilistic Voting. The general equilibrium theory is one of the foremost achievements in economics. Under fairly plausible assumptions, it demonstrates the existence, uniqueness and stability of a market equilibrium … Expand.

A general constitutional possibility theorem. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem shows that there exist no transitive social preferences in nonoligarchic societies for all possible profiles of individual preference orderings. Similarly, a … Expand.

View 1 excerpt. An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking. Recent formal models of legislatures have proved that equilibrium outcomes are extremely unlikely without either 1 extreme restrictions upon preferences or 2 constraints upon the agenda.

The … Expand. Highly Influenced. View 3 excerpts, cites background. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together … Expand. Nearly thirty years of research on social choice has produced a large body of theoretical results.

The underlying structure of the models that have generated these results is highly atomistic and … Expand. House of Representatives. It has long been assumed that, as a general rule, powerful members of Congress are able to distort federal spending patterns to the benefit of their own constituencies.

June Tideman, T. A new and superior process for making social choices. Journal of Political Economy , October: — Tullock, G. Entrepreneurial politics. Research Monograph No. General irrelevance of the general impossibility theorem. Quarterly Journal of Economics 81 May. Also in Tullock ; Toward a mathematics of politics. Page citations are to the book A simple algebraic logrolling model. The American Economic Review 60 3 : — Download references.

You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar. Reprints and Permissions. Why so much stability. Public Choice 37, — Download citation. Issue Date : January Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:.

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article. Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative. Skip to main content. Search SpringerLink Search.